Though there appears to be ample evidence for the presence of reciprocal motivations in lab experiments, recently there has been some discussion about the empirical importance of reciprocity as a motivating force. We build on the theoretical results from our earlier paper, Englmaier and Leider (2008) , and argue that in the discussion so far an important aspect was not accounted for: the ability of the agent to "repay the gift". We conduct a real effort experiment where we vary the effect of the agent's effort on the principal's payoff. Furthermore we collect additional information that allows us to control for the agents' effort costs and whether they can be classified as reciprocal or not. From our model we derive non-trivial predictions on how different types of individuals will react to our experimental variation and confirm them in our experimental data.
Introduction
The problem of providing incentives to an employee when actions are not contractible is widespread, both empirically and theoretically. The standard approach has been to focus on output realizations as a (noisy) measure of employee effort. By tying the level of the agent's compensation to the amount of output produced, the agent is given monetary incentives to increase his output. An extensive theoretical literature, e.g. Holmström (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , and Holmström and Milgrom (1991) , has emphasized the importance of strong monetary incentives to induce effort, although this imposition of risk on the agent leads to inefficiency and excess costs for the firm. Though this literature has certainly generated numerous important insights, there are still several important empirical puzzles concerning the structure of real world incentive schemes. A literature has developed that considers alternative sources of incentives in the workplace. Akerlof (1982) is an early example that studies other mechanisms than explicit monetary incentives to elicit effort. Akerlof models the labor relation as a gift exchange where agents respond to generous treatment by the firm (i.e. generous wage levels) by exerting more than minimal effort. While this work was based on the effect of work "norms", our paper will build on explicit models of social preferences, in particular "reciprocity" (i.e. the fact that an individual values positively the utility of someone who has been kind to the individual), first formally described by Rabin (1993) . Additionally, an extensive experimental literature has developed that demonstrates the important impact of social preferences, in particular reciprocity, on decision making (cf. Fehr and Schmidt (2003) , Fehr and Gaechter (1998) ). We routinely observe high effort in gift exchange games or high contributions in public good games, even when the material incentives cannot support it.
Based on our earlier work, Englmaier and Leider (2008) , we argue that a key determinant of the efficiency of reciprocal motivation is the ability of an agent to repay a gift, i.e. the importance of the magnitude of the benefit to the principal from high effort. We test our model in the lab by manipulating the extent to which the principal benefits from worker productivity. In the experiment we find that the manager's benefit is important, observing positive gift exchange when the manager directly benefits. We collect additional data so we can identify the non-trivial role agents' effort costs play in determining the response to an initial gift. Furthermore, we can identify reciprocal subjects, and show that they exhibit a 1 greater response to a high wage.
Though, there is extensive evidence of reciprocity in the lab, Gneezy and List (2006) have recently argued that the effect of gift exchange in the field is only minor, fast disappearing and overall not a viable employment strategy. In Gneezy and List students are hired for a day job and half of them get a surprise rise of their hourly pay. Gneezy and List document that there is only a short lived effect of this gift on the students' effort. Overall the 'firm' would have fared better hiring more students for the lower wage rate. Kube et al. (2006) replicate the Gneezy and List study and find no effect of the gift whatsoever. However, in both of these cases the subjects were given no indication that the manager who provided the higher wage would benefit directly from increased productivity (and the jobs were not ones where an employee would expect such a compensation structure). In contrast, Bellemare and Shearer (2006) analyze gift exchange within a real firm (where the value of output is clear to the workers). In their study, there is a surprise bonus for the workers in a tree planting firm in British Columbia. Their results indicate a 10% increase in worker productivity on average which slowly dwindles down. Moreover the effect of the gift is more marked if the worker has been with the firm for longer. Hence Bellemare and Shearer argue that spot market field experiments only establish a lower bound of the effects of gift exchange in real firms that are characterized by longstanding and ongoing relations that amplify the effects. 1 Our model in Englmaier and Leider (2008) highlights the role of the value of effort, and thus we explore the impact of this dynamic explicitly in our laboratory experiment. We set out a model, capturing the essence of reciprocity. A risk neutral firm hires a risk averse worker to exert non-verifiable effort. The novelty in our model that the agent's utility increases in the principal's revenue, i.e. firm profits, whenever the firm is provides the agent with a rent in excess of his outside option. Thus when the firm is generous to the agent by giving him something valuable (additional compensation), the agent desires to provide in turn something of value to the firm. The agent's intensity of reciprocal concerns is measured by a parameter η. The agent's reciprocal attitude can now be used by the firm to align the agent's preferences with those of the firm, thus generating intrinsic motivation. We also 1 There is some additional evidence of gift exchange in the field, e.g. Falk (forthcoming) who documents an increase in donations if donors get a present with the solicitation letter or Leuven et al (2005) who document that firms with a more reciprocal work force are more likely to provide their workers with general training (as they deem it more likely that this gift will be repaid within an ongoing relation).
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derive two main comparative statics on the nature of the optimal contract. When the agent is more intrinsically reciprocal, i.e. has a higher η, or when the effect of the agent's effort on the principal's revenue is greater, the stronger is ceteris paribus the incentive for the agent to work hard.
Based on our extensive model of contracting we sketch a specific toy model of the labor market gift exchange relation. An agent's decision whether to reciprocate will depend on whether his extra effort costs are outweighed by his extra utility from reciprocity. The latter will depend on four components: The agent's concern for reciprocity, the size of the initial gift (i.e. the generosity of the wage offer), the effect of the extra effort on the principal's revenue, and the agent's ability. Several predictions emerge from our analysis:
• Paying a high wage should increase productivity
• When the effect of output on the principal's payoff is small, the high ability workers will be induced to exert effort by a high wage relative to a low wage.
• When the effect of output on the principal's payoff is larger, the low ability workers will be induced to exert effort by a high wage, relative to a low wage.
These detailed predictions allow us to make a more nuanced test of gift-exchange than in Gneezy and List (2006) . We begin by testing for the importance of ability and managerial payoff in the laboratory using a real effort task. This is the first test of gift-exchange in the lab using a real effort task that explores the importance of managerial benefit and the role of individual ability that we are aware of.
In our experiment subjects in the role of "manager" could hire subjects in the role of "worker" to perform a coding task, where agents have to match as many words to a specific code as possible in a pre-specified time period of 25 minutes, for a fixed wage payment of $10. The manager's pay depended on the number of correct answers solved by the agents (guessing was discouraged with a penalty). We exogenously varied how much one correct answer was worth to the manager, i.e. the 'effect on the manager's payoff', and we gave the managers the possibility to offer the agents a higher flat wage ($20) than the one publicly announced at the beginning of the experiment, i.e. we varied 'the size of the initial gift'. If the manager decided not to offer the higher wage, the agent never learned about this option. We also obtain information on individual ability and personality type to more precisely estimate the impact of a higher wage.
The results of the experiment confirm our predictions from above. In the treatment where the manager has a small benefit from effort, we observe a significant response to high wages among high ability workers, but not overall. In the high payoff condition we find a significant overall response to the high wage (between 2% and 11%), particularly among the low ability workers (since high ability workers exerted high effort already without the high wage in the high payoff treatment). We find that this positive response is stronger among high reciprocity subjects, measured either directly via the trust game, or indirectly via a personality test.
Our study indicates that employing agents' reciprocity as a part of a firms personnel policy is a viable alternative and can be successfully done. However, it is important that various complementary parts of the firms compensation and HR policy are coordinated to maximize the effect of reciprocity. The size of gifts and the receiver of the reciprocal act have to be identified, and naturally a firm's hiring policy should also be adjusted to the intended use of compensation practices -if a firm plans to make use of reciprocity, the hired workforce better be reciprocal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out and analyzes the lab experiment while section 3 concludes. The Appendix contains tables, instructions and figures.
The Experiment

A simple Model
We begin by considering a simplified version of the model in Englmaier and Leider (2008).
There we solve the full moral hazard problem and derive the structure of optimal contracts in a standard principal agent problem with reciprocal agents. Specifically we show that explicit monetary incentives and implicit reciprocal incentives are substitutes. For the pur-4 pose of deriving the predictions for our experiment and to match the experimental set-up we focus here on flat wage payments w which are generically not optimal but which are, as shown in Englmaier and Leider (2008) , sometimes able to implement the efficient effort level.
Furthermore this eliminates explicit incentives and allows us to focus on purely reciprocal motivations.
There is a risk neutral principal who wants to maximize expected profits and one risk averse agent who cares about reciprocity. We assume that there are n states of the world that are characterized by payoffs q i with i = 1, ..., n respectively. The agent can take one of two actions (effort levels) a 1 and a 2 with a 1 < a 2 and corresponding costs from effort A contract (w,â) is a fixed wage payment w, as well as an (unenforceable) request for an actionâ. In a real world context we could think ofâ as an informal job description or a code of conduct. In the lab we will interpretâ as a commonly understood norm. As we are concerned with changes in behavior these details are not key to our results. Whileâ is not binding, it serves to fix the agent's beliefs about the principal's intended generosity (since the expected utility of a contract depends on the agent's action).
The agent's inherent concern for reciprocity is measured by η ∈ [0, +∞). We allow for potentially differing costs of effort, captured by a scalar γ > 0. The agent's utility function given that he takes action a , under the contract (w,â), is given by
whereū is the agent's outside option in the labor market. The utility function consists of three parts:
i) utility from the monetary wage payment u(w).
iii) effort costs γc (a ) .
Hence a "generous" contract is one that provides a rent to the agent, i.e. an expected monetary utility in excess of the agent's outside option. A more generous contract will induce the agent to feel more reciprocal, which here means that he will derive greater marginal and absolute utility from the principal's revenue. Now consider the decision of an agent whether to work hard, i.e. choose a 2 , or not. To make the problem interesting, assume the principal wants to implement a 2 . An agent will prefer to choose a 2 over a 1 if and only if
This condition immediately tells us, that for a given wagew and a given monetary value M only agents with effort costs below a critical threshold γ * will choose to work hard. This threshold can be relaxed (i.e. more people be induced to choose a 2 ) if M, i.e. the monetary value to the principal, is increased or when a higher wage, increasing u(w), is paid. This also implies that for a high M relatively higher cost agents will be affected by a wage increase.
These arguments lead to the following three predictions which can be neatly summarized in • Paying a high wage increases productivity
• When the effect of output on the principal's payoff is small, the set of workers induced to exert effort by a high wage, relative to a low wage, will be the high ability workers.
• When the effect of output on the principal's payoff is larger, the set of workers induced to exert effort by a high wage, relative to a low wage, will be the low ability workers.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 1 (Behavioral Predictions -Marginally affected Agent) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * These predictions are richer than the somewhat simplistic claim in Gneezy and List (2007) that a gift has to lead to substantial reciprocation. We have designed an experiment to test the predictions derived above.
Experimental Design -Lab Experiment
The experiment took place in the CLER lab at Harvard Business School. We ran 20 sessions in July 2007. In total we had 282 subjects from the CLER lab subject database participating.
They were told that they are participating in a study on decision making behavior in markets.
All subjects received a show-up fee of $10. The workers were exogenously assigned to be either workers (192) or managers (90).
While gift exchange games have been studied extensively in the lab, we are aware of only one other paper that uses a real effort task. Brüggen and Strobel (2007) compare chosen effort to real effort as experimental methodologies, and find gift exchange under the real effort task. However, they do not measure individual ability, nor relate the gift exchange task to other measures of reciprocity.
In our experiment, subjects in the manager role could hire an agent to perform a "coding task" where agents have to match as many words to a specific code as possible in a prespecified time period of 25 minutes. We announced publicly that managers could choose to hire workers at a fixed wage payment of $10. If the manager chose not to hire a worker, they both got $0. No manager chose not to hire a worker. Managers could also choose to surprise the worker with a fixed wage payment of $20, i.e. substantially higher than the one publicly announced at the beginning of the experiment. By doing so we observed two values for the size of the wage "gift" the workers received from the manager. If the manager decided not to offer the higher wage, the agent never learned about this option.
The manager's pay depended on the number of correct answers solved by the agents (guessing was discouraged with a penalty). To balance the number of observations between high and low wage offers, we matched multiple agents to some principals.
We exogenously created two different payoff conditions for the managers:
• Low Payoff Condition
The manager receives $40, plus a premium of $0.04 for every correct answer of the worker in the coding task, minus a penalty of $0.01 for every incorrect answer, minus the wage payment to the worker. Based on previous tests on the coding task, we picked the fixed and variable components of the manager's pay such that the average payoff of a manager should be roughly the same across the two conditions in order to minimize the role for unconditional distributional preferences.
In order to control for differing ability we had all subjects do the coding task for 5 minutes with a piece rate of $0.30 per correct answer and a penalty of $0.08 per incorrect answer in order to discourage guessing. From the differing performance in this piece rate treatment we can infer about the agents' differing abilities or costs of effort respectively.
To allow us further analysis we had agents play a trust game which we called "sending task". From the behavior in the trust game we construct a variable to measure reciprocity, namely the difference between the lowest and the highest share they chose to return. Given that those almost always are chosen for the lowest and highest initial gift respectively, our 8 measure basically approximates the average slope of the initial gift/return gift relation, a common measure of the intensity of reciprocity
Finally we had agents take a "Big 5 Personality Test" which is also used frequently by firms in their hiring procedures, see Autor and Scarborough (2007) . We then identify subjects who score highly on the trait "agreeableness", which has been shown experimentally to relate to reciprocity (see Ben-Ner et al. 2004, Ashton et al. 1997 ).
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High agreeableness also corresponds with one of the criteria Autor and Scarborough identify in the hiring practice of the firm they study.
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The final payment of the subjects was determined by a dice and was either their payoff from the worker/manager coding task, the piece rate coding task or the sending task.
Results -Lab Experiment
Worker output was measured at 30-second intervals. We will use these high-frequency measurements, as well as the total output over the 25 minute task. We begin by considering the mean and median for the total number of questions answered in each treatment, presented in Table 1 .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 1 (Lab -Overall Means Coding Task) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Offering a high wage increased output by almost 9.5 questions in the low payoff treatment, and by 13 questions in the high payoff treatment. Pooling the two payoff treatments, the may relate to reciprocity as well, the relationship between reciprocity and agreeableness was most robust across specification and sample. 5 The firm gave hiring preference to applicants with positive z-scores for agreeableness, conscientiousness, and extroversion.
effect of the wage offer on the raw means is marginally significant (ranksum test p = 0.0591).
However, since individuals vary widely in ability, we will need to control for that to get a good estimate of the treatment effect. In Table 2 , we show the mean output in each treatment for individuals in each quartile of performance in the individual speed test.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 2 (Lab -Speed by Quartiles) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * As one would imagine, individuals of higher ability performed better in the coding task To that end, we employ the following specification to allow for separate intercepts and speed coefficients in each treatment. We estimate using our high-frequency observations of productivity (the number of correct answers per 30-second interval)
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. We run RandomEffects with a time trend, as well as Random-Effects with AR1 errors, and GLS with panelspecific AR1 errors and between-panel heteroskedasticity
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.
Estimating the same specification on the total output yields similar results, though less precisely estimated. 7 A Wooldridge test for serial correlation finds autocorrelation (p < 0.01), and a Likelihood Ratio test suggests panel heteroskedasticity (p < 0.01). Table 3 (Lab -30-second estimates) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The estimates for regressing the total number of correct answers are presented in Table   3 . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 2 (Lab -Total Treatment Effect) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Perhaps more interesting is Figure 3 , which shows the difference in output from offering a high wage within a payoff treatment. The filled in bars denote significance, while the starred labels denote that the difference is significant. In the low payoff treatment, offering a high wage has a positive effect on high ability workers, and a negative effect on low ability workers.
For the high payoff treatment, in contrast, offering a high wage has a positive effect on low ability workers, and a negligible effect on high ability workers (since they are working hard even with a low wage). Both effects are positive but not significant at the median ability.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 3 (Lab -Wage Effect) to appear here 11 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The negative effect for low ability workers is not directly predicted by our theory, however it can be consistent with the model if we consider negative reciprocity. In our standard model reciprocity can only have positive effects, since the contract must meet the agent's individual rationality constraint -i.e. he has to be willing to accept the contract because it is better than his outside option. In our experiment, however, the agent did not have the ability to choose an outside option. Low ability workers may interpret a high wage (given low payoffs) from the manager as indicative of high expectations of output to justify the wage. In fact, if we take the interpretation of low ability as indicating high cost of effort, then the low-ability agent may feel that the principal's expectations for his effort/output are too high. That is, he may believe that the principal expects such a high effort that the agent's utility is in fact negative. This may lead the agent to shirk so that the principal is "punished". Similarly, high payoffs may also lead the agents to believe the principal expects great effort and output (since it is so valuable to the principal).
We also relax the linearity assumption by estimating a specification with dummies for each tercile of baseline speed.
8 Table 4 presents this regression.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 4 (Lab -30-second estimates with Ability Dummies) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 4 presents the estimated wage effects for the low and high treatments for each of the three ability groups. As in our linear specification we find that in the low payoff treatment, there is a negative effect of the wage on the lowest ability workers, and a positive effect on higher ability workers. In the high payoff condition, in contrast, we find that the largest wage effect is among low ability workers; with a smaller positive effect among moderate ability workers and a small negative effect among high ability workers. As before, the small/negative treatment effect among high ability workers is because almost all of the 8 We choose three groups so that later when we separate out subjects with different preference types we have enough subjects in each ability-preference category to generate good estimates.
workers with high ability are exerting effort across different treatments. Taking the average treatment effect for the whole sample, we actually find a significant negative effect in the low payoff treatment (−0.34 questions per 30 seconds, or 17 questions over the whole task) -driven by the negative response of the low ability workers. In the high payoff treatment we find a significant positive effect overall (0.44 questions per 30 seconds, or 22 questions over the whole task). The difference between the payoff treatments is also significant. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 4 (Lab -Wage Effects with Ability Dummies) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * While our results accord with the predictions of our reciprocity model, we would like to further strengthen the case that the observed gift-exchange represents "reciprocity". To that end, we look to the results from the Trust Game to identify those individuals who are most likely to be reciprocal types. We should expect that our experimental sample is a mix of "selfish" subjects and "reciprocal" subjects, and that treatment manipulations should only have an effect on the reciprocal subjects. Therefore, if we can focus the estimates of the treatment effect on the reciprocal subjects, then the estimated treatment effects should be larger (since they won't be averaged with the subjects who exhibit no treatment effects).
In the trust game we have all subjects specify an amount to return to the sender for each possible sender decision. This gives us a complete return function for all subjects.
The literature on reciprocity generally considers an upwards-sloping return function (i.e. . Figure 5 presents the results of our trust game. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * would still suggest that the two tasks are measuring the same aspect of social preferences, i.e. the same mechanism driving the behavior. We also calculate total treatment coefficients evaluated at various levels of reciprocity.
This indicates the magnitude of the treatment effect for a subject with a reciprocity type of varying levels. Note that all of the treatment coefficients increase in level as reciprocity increases, particularly the coefficients in the high payoff treatment. This suggests that while there is some small underlying level of gift-exchange for selfish types, the majority of the 10 Similar results may be obtained by using the difference between the $1 and $10 decision, or by using the slope of the linear fit to the return function 14 substantial gift exchange we observe in the high payoff treatment for the full sample is being driven by high reciprocity types.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 5 (Lab -Reciprocity Regression -30sec) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * This is easier to see if we instead use a dummy denoting subjects with a high measure of reciprocity (in particular, above the 66th percentile), and dummies for ability groups.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 6 (Lab -Base Regression with Reciprocity Dummy) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * To see the effect of reciprocal preferences, Figures 6 and 7 present the estimated effects of offering a higher wage for the low and high payoff treatments respectively. In the low payoff treatment low-reciprocity subjects of all ability levels exhibit a negative response to the high wage offer, while medium and high ability subjects with high reciprocity respond positively.
The overall effect is significant for low reciprocity workers (−0.27 questions per 30 seconds, or 13.5 questions overall), while the effect is insignificant for high reciprocity workers (0.09 questions per 30 seconds). The difference in between the low and high reciprocity subjects is significant (0.36 questions per 30 seconds, or 18 questions for the whole task). For the high payoff treatment both low-reciprocity and high-reciprocity types show a positive response among low ability types; however the high reciprocity types have a positive response among middle ability subjects, and a negative response among high ability subjects. Both groups show a positive overall effect of the wage increase (0.19 and 0.24 questions per 30 seconds, or 9.5 and 12 questions overall), with the difference being positive but not significant. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 6 (Lab -Wage Effects with Reciprocity Dummies for Low Manager Payoff) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 7 (Lab -Wage Effects with Reciprocity Dummies for High Manager Payoff) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Since real firms typically won't have information from an experimental trust game when hiring workers, we now look to the results of the Big-5 Personality Test. We begin by regressing our reciprocity measure on the z-scores for the five personality traits; the results are presented in Table 7 . In accordance with the previous literature we find a (marginally) significant positive relationship between reciprocity and agreeableness.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 7 (Lab -Personality Test -Details) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * To identify the differing treatment effect among high-agreeableness subjects we define a dummy variable denoting if a subject is above the 66th percentile in agreeableness. We then estimate our output regression interacting all of the treatment variables with the personality dummy. The results are presented in Table 8 . As with reciprocity, subjects with high agreeableness exhibit treatment effects of greater magnitude, suggesting they are driving a substantial portion of our effect.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 8 (Lab -Regression with Personality Test Dummy) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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To better understand the differences between low and high agreeableness subjects, we again estimate a specification with dummies for low, middle and high ability workers. The results are presented in Table 9 .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Table 9 (Lab -Regression with Personality Test and Speed Dummies) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Figure 8 (Lab -Wage Effects with Personality Test Dummies for Low Manager Payoff) to appear here * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Discussion
Revisiting the predictions generated by our model, we find several points supporting our reciprocity theory. We do find an increase in output when subjects are paid a high wage by their manager and it is larger and more significant when the manager has a larger benefit from high productivity. We also find that the strongest increase in productivity in the low payoff treatment was among high ability workers, while the strongest increase in the high payoff treatment was among low ability workers. This accords with our prediction that increasing the value of output to the manager should make the marginal worker induced to effort a lower ability worker, since high ability workers may exert effort even without the high wage. We also find evidence that subjects that can be identified as reciprocal workers will exhibit a more positive response to their productivity from a high wage offer. We can identify these subjects either directly via a trust game, or indirectly via a personality test.
Inequity Aversion, rather than reciprocity, has often been used to model gift-exchange in studying agency problems. However, Inequity Aversion has some significant limitations in modeling gift-exchange. With weak or no monetary incentives, social preferences in the form of Inequity Aversion will only induce the agent to exert effort if either 1 the agent begins with a larger payoff than the manager, and the manager receives > 50% of the profit from the agent's effort (thus effort reduces the agent's advantageous inequality) OR 2 the agent begins with a smaller payoff than the manager, and the agent receives > 50% of the profit from his own effort (thus effort reduces the agent's disadvantageous inequality).
Moreover, the introduction of a high wage will only induce excess effort if it creates (or exacerbates) one of these conditions. Typically lab gift-exchange games operate under the first setup. If the principal offers a low wage, then the manager and the agent will have relatively equal payoffs if the agent does not work, and the manager will be enriched by effort. If the manager offers a high wage, then the agent will have a much higher payoff if he does not work, but can bring up the manager's payoff to be more equal if he does work.
In our experiment, in the low payoff treatment, neither of these conditions is true. For both the low and high wage, the manager has a higher payoff than the agent, and when the agent works hard he only further increases the inequality. Therefore, inequity aversion could not be causing the agent to work hard, and if anything should cause the agent to purposefully answer questions incorrectly to lower the manager's payoff. Moreover, since the marginal effect of effort on inequality is the same under the low and high wage, under the standard Fehr-Schmidt preferences for Inequity Aversion, the effect of this form of social preferences should be the same regardless of the wage. Moreover, since the effort of higher ability workers will increase inequality by a greater amount, they should be less likely to work hard in both wage conditions. For the high payoff treatments, while the high wage case is in general ambiguous (since for less than 150 correct answers the agent has a higher payoff than the manager) the vast majority of agents (88%) answer enough questions correctly that the manager will have a higher payoff, and more than half (57%) answer enough questions that the manager's payoff is at least $10 larger than theirs. Moreover, in the low wage condition, the agent will be at a disadvantage if he answers at least 50 questions correctly (which all but one agent does), and 88% answer enough questions that the manager has at least a $10 higher payoff than the agent. However, the higher value of correct answers to the manager, and in particular the higher impact of effort for high ability workers, should mean that inequity averse agents work less hard (especially high ability ones). Hence, Inequality Aversion does not appear to do a good job of explaining the treatment effects in our experiment.
Conclusion
The importance of fairness and social preferences especially for the work relation has long been documented. Recently the empirical importance of reciprocity as a motivating force has been questioned, namely by Gneezy and List (2006) . Based on our earlier work, Englmaier and Leider (2008), we argue that this critique misses out on a key determinant of the efficiency of reciprocal motivation: the ability of an agent to repay a gift, i.e. the importance of the magnitude of the benefit to the principal from high effort.
We test our model in the lab by manipulating the extent to which the principal benefits from worker productivity. In the experiment we find that the manager's benefit is important, observing positive gift exchange when the manager directly benefits. We collect additional data so we can identify the non-trivial role agents' effort costs play in determining the response to an initial gift. Furthermore, we can identify reciprocal subjects, and show that they exhibit a greater response to a high wage. Hence we demonstrate that reciprocity is not only a prominent form of social preferences that has to be kept in mind when designing incentive contracts but can in fact be used to design more effective compensation systems.
Obviously our study is but a step in the direction of more fully exploring this field. For example, further empirical work can explore the optimal magnitude of the gift, and the proper mix between reciprocal and explicit motivation, to maximize the profitability of gift exchange. Our theoretical model suggests that a job where explicit incentives work poorly due to a noisy production function, and where output is highly valuable to the principal is the environment where reciprocal incentives should be striving.
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